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Dr. Michael Seeborg
Abstract
Given that the executive branch's party desires reelection and that the economy is an important
variable in the eyes of the electorate, to what extent has the president and his party been able to
exert influence over economic variables in the months preceding an election? Much of the existing
literature suggests that there may be an important cyclical pattern between the four-year election
cycle and economic variables such as real GDP growth and real disposable income. Using data
from the Council of Economic Advisors and the Presidential Elections dataset, this paper finds
moderate evidence for the existence of a political business cycle as it applies to GDP growth rates
and real disposable income. Subsequent analysis reveals that during elections with significantly
high and low GDP growth rates, election results can be perfectly predicted based on the theoretical
model.

A Government is not supported a hundredth part so much by the constant, un((orm, quiet
prosperity ofthe country as by those damned spurts which Pitt used to have just in the nick of
time.
-Brougham, 1814
I. Introduction:

Since Tufte's (1978) original publication on the econolnic origins of election cycles, the
public choice literature on the political business cycle has argued that self-interested incumbent
politicians and their parties can Inanipulate the state of the tnacroeconolny for political gains.
The literature supposes that a pattern etnerges within a politician's party's term in office where
there is "relative austerity in early years" followed by a "potlatch right before the [proceeding]
election" (Nordhaus, 1975). These cycles can be understood to exist on top of the naturally
occurring business cycle as politicians attempt to artificially bolster the economy above its

natural point right before the electorate goes to the polls. These positive deviations frotn the
business cycle, if properly timed, have been shown to intluence voter behavior.
The relationship between the state of the economy and the point within the election
period has been hypothesized most strongly for the United States presidency. Perhaps better than
any other politician, the president has the unique ability to influence outcomes in the
macroeconomy through his use of executive order and congressional and possibly Federal
Reserve influence. Furthermore, studies have shown that the president is the most likely person
to be praised when the economy is in an upturn and the tnost likely to bear the political brunt of
the electoral backlash when the economy underperforms. One can then see why an incutnbent
administration, while operating under the limiting economic and political constraints, might try
and manipulate the short-run course of the national economy in order to improve the party's
standing in the upcoming elections.
While voters can certainly appreciate a growing economy at any time during the election
cycle, political business cycles (PBes) can be problematic if they distort the true state of the
economy from the eyes of the voters. When the electorate sees that its income is increasing and
unemployment is falling, they may not consider the possibility that these are short-term positive
shocks and that the tradeoffs for these distortionary endeavors will inevitably increase taxes and
price levels in the long run.
This paper explores the existence of electoral-economic cycles as they apply to recent US
presidential elections. It tests the hypothesis that the probability of an incutnbent or an
incumbent's party's reelection is significantly influenced by movetnents in macroeconomic
variables which can, at least in the short run, be influenced by the executive adtninistration. It
defines a series of motivations that might compel an incumbent governtnent to manipulate
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economic variables in hopes of securing reelection. Looking at US presidential election cycles
since 1948, this paper finds Inoderate evidence for political business cycles, especially as they
are tied to real GDP growth rates and per capita real disposable income. In an appendix, the
paper goes on to exatnine case studies where real GDP growth rates were especially high or low,
and finds that when the economy is doing exceptionally well, voters reelect the incumbent party.
When the growth rates are unusually low, however, the inculnbent party has always been
defeated, regardless of the relative ilnportance of other catnpaign issues.
This article proceeds as follows: Section II reviews literature related to the electoral
implications of InacroeconOlnic variable Inovement under an uncertainty fratnework. Section III
explores the theoretical lnodel for this study and draws hypotheses for empirical results. Sections
IV and V discuss the data, the research design, and the empirical tnode1. Section VI reports on
the results of the study. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper by drawing policy implications,
acknowledging the lilnits of the study, and suggesting avenues for future research.
II. Review of the Literature

Arguments made for political business cycles were initially anecdotal in nature
(Nordhaus, 1975); however, in recent decades, with the advent of strong Keynesianism in the
election periods after World War II, researchers have sought to identify specific trends in the
macroeconolny centered around the US presidential election cycle.
The core argument upon which the study of political business cycles rests was first laid
out by Edward R. Tufte in his selninal work Political Control of the Economy (1978), in which
he conducts one of the first empirical analyses of P BCs in the United States. Throughout his
work, Tufte made three ilnportant contributions to the study of PBCs. First, he demonstrated
through historical research that Alnerican incumbent presidents did consider economic policy
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and the electoral calendar when making fiscal policy decisions. More importantly, however, the
work revealed systematic movements in US transfer policies in accordance with the timing of
elections, with the majority of the upswings occurring in October and November of the election
years. Accompanying the policy movement were subsequent upticks in Tufte's chief economic
variable: real disposable income (RD I). Consider Figure 1, which details the quarterly change in
RDI and government transfer payments surrounding Nixon's 1972 reelection:
Figure 1: Transfer Payment Growth in E lection Period

Rgure 1 : Changes in Real Disposible Income and Government
Transfers, 1972-1973
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Figure 1 shows the quarterly path of RDI per capita between 1972 and 1973, with its
ever-accelerating clitnb to the fourth quarter of 1972 followed by post-election decay. The
exquisite political precision of this economic course is atypical of the exactness of other political
business cycles and must have partly been attributable to sheer luck. However, one cannot
discount that much of the pre-election economic acceleration had to have been the result of
deliberate planning and mobilization of policy instruments to produce such significant changes in
government transfer payments.
Finally Tufte was able to show evidence of cyclical movement in other economic
indicators such as growth, unemployment, and int1ation. He hypothesized that these variables are
more difficult to control inside an administrative framework because they are so tied to real
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econolnic conditions. For exmnple: The high unetnploytnent during the Reagan years is partly
attributable to the large influx of women into the labor force. Because the economy was not
automatically prepared to absorb these new labor force participants, unemployment numbers
were inflated for a titne as labor market adjusted to tnake rOOln for new labor. As a result of
outside influences such as these, policy tnakers must be content to tweak certain economic
indicators around the edges.
Beyond Tufte, nlajor works by Lewis-Beck ( 1988) and Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (200 1)
support the opportunistic tnodel. Lewis-Beck (1988) extends Tufte's model to a few of the major
developed Western-European powers, including Gennany, Italy, France, Spain, and the United
KingdOln. The results essentially Inirror those of Tufte: evidence is varied, but fairly supportive
of the existence of econolnic policy cycles and of growth in nOlninal indicators (such as RDI),
though the evidence is silnilarly marginal in trending economic indicators to these countries'
electoral calendars.
A Inore recent article authored by Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001) focuses on the specific
indicators which influence the probability that an incumbent will be reelected. They point out
'
correctly that individual voters use infonnation in different ways; in accounting for the state of
the economy, SOlne will focus tnore on growth rates while others will be Inore concerned with
inflation or unetnploytnent. That being said, politicians cannot simply optitnize one of these
econotnic indicators. It becolnes necessary during an election cycle for the incumbent party to
keep all econOlnic indicators in good standing with the electorate. The problem is confounded
when we recognize that Inany of these variables, mnong thetn inflation and unetnployment, are
naturally negatively related. Delnocrats lnay choose to focus on unelnployment rates, whereas
Republican might prefer to run political business cycles by keeping inflation in check. Readers
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can then appreciate that such policy lTIeaSUres lTIUSt be intricately woven in order to operate
effectively.
Berlemann and Markwardt (2006) extend this analysis to include forward looking
expectations, explaining that voters will incorporate speculative expectations into their
assessment of macroeconomic indicators, helping to explain why, even in a prospective
expectations model, incumbent politicians who preside over a strong economy are more likely to
be reelected for another term.
In addition to being forward looking, the new model cOlTImonly accepted by election
researchers (Berlemann and Markwardt, 2006) is also heavily discounted in favor of those
months closest to the election. The old Tufte model had given equal weight to the entire period
leading up to the election, and therefore gave too little weight to the tilTIe-Specific events that
occur directly before the election. Consider Figure 2, where w indicates the weight of policy in
time t and t terminates on Election Day:
Figure 2: Discounting Fiscal Policies before Election Periods
\V

\V

\y

(1)

T

(2)

T

(3)

T

One can easily see that the old Tufte model (1) is not compatible with prospective voting theory.
By averaging out positive changes and understating electorally lTIotivated economic lTIOVements,
this model reasons that every period during an incumbent's or incumbent's party's tenure is
equally important when voters are evaluating his economic record.
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On the other hand, Models 2 and 3 suggest that Inore weight must be given to events that
are closer to the election than those OCCUlTing earlier in the pre-election period. A retrospective
model can accomplish this by generating a "ramp-up" effect on the election indicator as the time
away frOln the indicator shrinks. In essence, the weight a voter gives to a given economic
outcolne increases as the time to an election nears. Specifically, in model 2, the weight a voter
grants a given outcome steadily climbs at a constant rate as the election draws nearer.
Conversely, the model on the far right tries to amplify the effects of timed policies which
deliver econOlnic boosts a few months before an election. In this Inodel voter myopia is designed
to capture the effects of titned econolnic upswings rather than slower lnacro-itnprovements by
focusing ahnost exclusive weight on a tilne period that is nearest to the election.
According to Filburn (2006), the basic underlying theory associated with political
business cycles is simple and its basic premises have remained intact since Tufte ( 1978). The
theoretical foundation of the PBC argulnent rests upon two realities and three necessarily stated
assulnptions. Taken together, the realities (which are generally accepted at face value) and the
assumptions establish incentive and opportunity for incumbent politicians to engage in
electioneerin g in the fonn of producing electoral economic cycles:
Reality 1 (Rl): Incumbent politicians desire reelection, both in terms of themselves and,

to a lesser degree, their party.
Reali(v 2 (R2): Inculnbents control policies which can affect perceived or actual

econolnic outcolnes.
Assumption 1 (A 1): Voters favor positive econolnic activity-high growth, low inflation

and unemploYlnent, increasing wealth, and low taxes-when retrospectively evaluating
the performance of an incUlnbent presidential candidate.
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Assumption 2 (A2): Voters tend to put lnore weight on econon1ic outcolnes that are near

the election cOlnpared to econolnic outcomes that occur early in the election cycle.
Assumption 3 (A3): Economic performance plays a significant role in the voters' decision

to reward or punish an incumbent politician at the ballot box.
All of these assumptions have been regularly supported throughout the literature as
"econolnic voting" has become a major presumption throughout the developed, democratic
world. Taken together, these points create a clear incentive structure for incumbent
electioneering: Incumbent politicians desire reelection (RI) and require electoral support to
achieve that end. The support is dependent (to some extent) upon real economic outcomes (A3)
which can be manipulated by those same incumbents (R2). Furthermore, the specific economic
movements (AI) and timing (A2) suggest that election years should produce economic upswings
where increased growth and wages, as well as lower inflation, unemployment, and taxes are
anticipated. (Filburn, 2006)
III. Theoretical Model

One of the most common fratneworks used to explain the existence of political business
cycles is the macroeconomic model of aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD).
Traditionally this model has been used to relate the price level with the level of output, and for
this purpose it suits us well. The AD curve relates the aggregate quantity of output demanded to
the price level, and the AS curve relates the quantity of output supplied to the price level.
From a political economist's perspective, policy makers' attempts to manipulate the short
run state of the economy has two potential outcomes: The first can be observed in the classical
Lucas framework, where increased government spending is anticipated by the voters, who then
incorporate it into their own expectations. See Figure 3. The AD curve shifts right from AD to
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AD 1, but there is an ilnlnediate response in aggregate supply, which shifts left from AS to AS 1
and instantaneously returns the Inodel to full emploYlnent, long run equilibriuln. This occurs
because people anticipate the shift in AD and have inflationary expectations. These voters are
not likely to be influenced by short-tenn econolnic boosts in the economy in the months before
an election because they recognize the incumbent's actions as self-interested and distortionary.
Prices quickly adjust froln P to Plat a constant output. The econolnic impact of a targeted PBC
will sitnply be increased price levels. Furthennore, because the outcomes of political
Inanipulations are fully and correctly anticipated, attempts by politicians to Inanipulate the
econolny will have little effect on voter behavior. Only where there are incorrect anticipations
can there be Inovelnents in real economic perfonnance as a result of government manipulation of
aggregate detnand.
Figure 3: AS-AD under rational expectations
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An alternative explanation which is tnore prevalent in PBC research circles involves the
Keynesian assumption of adaptive expectations. In this fratnework, people base their
expectations only on past economic perfonnance and slowly adjust their expectations when past

9

performance changes. Voters can be swayed by pre-election fiscal policies, even if those policies
will have long-term costs after the election. Consider Figure 4:
Figure 4: AS-AD under adaptive expectations, s hort-run
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In the months before the general election, the sitting government can try to alter the short
term state of the economy by shocking AD to the right. This can be done through increased
government spending, additional transfers to the electorate to increase real disposable income, or
by encouraging the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates. Because these changes are
unanticipated, from a Keynesian perspective the impact of these policies will be felt by
individuals in the economy for a certain period of time. Managed well, inculnbent politicians
could conceivably alter the short run state of the economy, with economic indicators reaching
their maximums close to Election Day. In terms of Figure 3, aggregate demand shifts from AD to
ADl and output shifts up to YI. The price level also increases slightly from P to PI.
However, in the Keynesian model, the benetits of fiscal policy cannot be felt in the long
run. Eventually, the AS curve will shift left again as wages and other input factor prices adjust
upward, bringing the economy back to its long run equilibrium, but at a higher equilibrium price
level.
10

The cyclical nature of political business cycle phenolnenon can then be interpreted
through the Keynesian lens. See Figure 5: The economy grows in the period before the election,
peaking as tilne approaches the Election Day. Post election, the reelected governlnent, which is
now insulated for another four years, can constrain the econolny in the first two years of their
term in office by raising taxes, reducing government expenditures, and allowing for higher
interest rates. They might do this to combat the inflation which is the inevitable result of pre
election fiscal and monetary stimulus. The other possibility is that they could simply wait for the
natural adjushnent back to long-run equilibriutn as prices rise and production falls. Either way,
production falls for a period after the election.
Figure 5: The Political Business Cycle

election

year 2

Furthermore, it is important to understand the relationship between the political business
cycle and the economic business cycle. Whereas it might be possible to isolate the variables
influencing electoral cycles, froln a practical perspective, the electorate is mostly concerned with
the ilnpact fiscal policy has on the traditional business cycles. In evaluating the state of the
economy before heading to the polls, the adaptive voter superimposes the political business cycle
on top of the economic naturally occurring cycle, and his evaluation focuses on the additive
influence of the PBC and the amount by which it can distort the real econolny. Consider Figure
6:
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Figure 6: The Distortionary E ffect of the Political Business Cycles

_ Economic Business Cycle
.. Economic Busiu.ess C}'Cle + .PBC

The dark black line represents the economic business cycle, whereas the gray line shows
the perceived state of the economy when political forces are acting. The effect of the PBC can
thus be understood as the deviation from the economic cycle. This simple model operates under
the strong and most times unrealistic assumptions that the business cycle period is concurrent
with the election cycles and these two cycles are naturally procyclical. In reality, the real
business cycle's period is independent of PBCs and the true state of the economy in the months
before an election could be anything from growth to recession. In the case of a recession, the
government would still have a strong incentive to operationalize a PBC as they tried to minimize
the negative impact of an economic slump.
Under Keynesian assumptions of adaptive expectations, this research moves forward with
the following hypotheses:
1) The probability for incumbents' reelection increases when economic performance
indicator variables are optitnized
2) Variables for economic growth, real disposable income growth, and government
transfer payment growth are positively related to incumbent performance at the polls.
3) Unemployment is negatively related to incUlnbent perfonnance at the polls.
IV. Data

The macroeconomic data used in this study are obtained from the Economic Indicators
database, published by the Council of Economic Advisors and cover the time period starting with
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the presidential election year of 1948 and going through the most recent presidential election in
2008 (CEA 2008). This tilne period was chosen because presidents during this period have all, to
some extent, incorporated a Keynesian, interventionist economic strategy into their
administrations. I have chosen not to include the Great Depression and the World War II periods
because government intervention in the economy was so large that researchers have found that
results substantially overestimate the significance of certain lnacroeconolnic indicators (Filburn,
2006; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 200 1). Prior to this time, Inost politicians did not believe that the
government should involve itself in the country's major economic affairs. In that case, political
business cycle analysis would be irrelevant before the advent of Keynesianism.
Two dependent variables have been defined for this paper: One, a dichotomous dummy
variable for reelection of the incumbent or the inculnbent's party was obtained from the
Presidential Elections: 1789-2004 dataset. Elections were coded (l) when the incumbent or his
party was reelected and (0) if there was a shift in executive control after the election. Regressions
using this dependent variable capture the probability that an inculnbent's party will be reelected,
given changes in the independent variables.
The second dependent variable, margin of victory, examines the numerical space between
the two major parties' candidates on Election Day, where the opposing party's vote percentage is
subtracted froln the incumbent party's vote percentage. These data were also obtained froln the
Presidential Elections dataset. The margin of victory is the difference between the incumbent's
voting percentage and the opposing party's voting percentage. This variable will allow the study
to examine the extent to which major upticks or downturns in the econolny affect voter
sentilnent.
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This paper defines four major independent variables: real GO P growth, real disposable
income, unemployment, and government transfer payments. As previously mentioned, growth
has been well-established in the literature as an indicator of economic health. In this case, growth
is measured at each quarter, and is then expressed as an annual rate. What this means is that, if
the quarterly real GDP growth rate were g, then the annual rate would be (( 1+g)4_1)* 100.
Therefore a 1% growth rate during a quarter translates into a [((1+0.01) 4-1)*100]

=

4.06%

annual growth rate percentage for that quarter.
Real disposable income was cited by Tufte as the key economic variable in predicting
election outcomes, and so it makes sense to study it with the extended data. It is measured as the
change in real disposable income for every quarter, and is then expressed as an annual rate.
The third independent variable, unemployment, has been studied before with mixed
results. It is included here as the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed and it is
measured as the average of every quarter in the election cycle.
Finally this paper tracks changes in government transfer payments across election cycles.
Theoretically, incumbent parties should increase these kinds of government expenditures in the
months preceding an election in order to increase the real disposable income of voters. This
variable is also measured for every quarter, and it is then expressed as an annual rate.
Table 1 below details the individual variables, their definitions, and the expected
coefficient signs:
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Table 1: Data Definitions
Variable

Dependent
REELECT

MAR_VICTORY
Explanatory
GROWTH

RDI

UNEMPLOYMENT
TRANSFERS

E xpected Sign

Definition

DichotolTIOUS dummy variable, 1 if president or inparty is re-elected, 0 if they are not
Difference between incUlTIbent's voting percentage
and the opposing party's voting percentage.
Average growth rate of real GDP for every quarter of
an election cycle, expressed as an annual rate
Percent change in real disposable income for every
quarter of an election cycle, expressed as an annual
rate
Percent of the labor force that is unemployed
Percent change in government transfer payments for
every quarter of an election cycle, expressed as an
annual rate

N/A
N/A

(+)
(+)

()
(+)
-

I expect the signs for the growth, real disposable income, and transfer payment variable
to all be positive. Large growth or increases in per capita consumer welfare should increase the
probability that individuals will view the incun1bent president and/or party favorably. In a
Keynesian lTIodel of adaptive expectations they should then be lTIOre willing to vote to re-elect
the president and/or party for another tenTI.
V. Methodology

. This paper attetTIpts to examine the impact of macroeconomic indicator variables on
election outcomes. Specifically, this study will consider the research problelTI through three
distinct avenues: The first uses descriptive analysis to track the lTIOVelTIent of economic
indicators around the election cycle and show evidence that there is SOlTIe evidence of a political
business cycle. When a political business cycle has been effectively generated (that is, when
lTIaCrOeCOnOlTIic indicators optin1ize in quarters near the election), incumbent politicians should
have an increased chance of being reelected.
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The second step involves a series of regressions to detennine the statistical significance
of the indicators in predicting reelection outcomes. The first set of regressions is estimated using
a probit model, with the dependent variable predicting the probability that the incumbent will be
reelected. The second set of regressions is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), with
the dependent variable considering the margin of victory (or defeat) of the incumbent politician
or party. By using both modes of analysis, this paper can capture probability predictions and can
also pick up the effects of economic changes on the Inargin of victory variable.
It is important to remember that this study predicts results for a limited number of US
presidential elections. Between 1948 and 2008, voters have only gone to the polls to elect a
president sixteen times. As a result, this paper suffers from a considerable degrees of freedom
problem, and readers should take care to acknowledge this shortcoming when reading through
the statistical results. It is more difficult to find statistical significance when a smaller number of
cases are being reviewed.
Finally this paper includes an appendix which exatnines a number of important election
case studies. The elections included in this paper were chosen for close examination because
their real GDP growth rates one month prior to the election were at least one standard deviation
above or below the sixteen case average. Given the slnall nUlnber of cases in this study and the
predicted tendency for the two major political parties to try to manipulate the economy in
different ways, the case studies enrich the analysis by providing insight into specific government
policies that helped to shape election outcomes.
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VI. Results and Discussion

A. Descriptives:

Running initial descriptive calculations helps to paint a broad image of what is going on
in the data. In Table 2 I have presented the descriptive statistics for each variable used. Note that
I am using data for only 16 presidential election cycles. The small nUlnber of individual election
cases creates a significant degrees of freedom problem, and as a consequence, regressions using
tnultiple independent variables cannot be run responsibly. In an attelnpt to partially alleviate this
probleln, data for the economic indicators were collected in quarterly tenns, and the election
variables were coded for their respective years. This Ineant, for example, that every quarter
between 1992 and 1996 was coded as 'reelect' for the dependent variable.
T a bl e 2 : D escnp
. fIve S tafIS fICS
Variable

Dependent
REELECT
MAR_VICTORY
Explanatory
GROWTH
UNEMPLOYMENT
RDI
TRANSFERS
N=240

Mean

Standard Deviation

0.533
0.054

0.5 16
0.038

3.399
5.562
3.408
1.463

2.332
1.504
4.310
7.618

Recall from the theory section of this paper that political business cycles are
hypothesized to occur over a four-year period, beginning with fiscal bolstering in the two years
preceding the presidential election, followed by a downturn in the two years after the president is
inaugurated. Table 3 reports the descriptive states for both the two years preceding the election
and the two years following the election. Theoretically, the GROWTH, RDI, and TRANSFER
variable indicators should be larger as parties run for reelection, while UNEMPLOYMENT
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should be lower. To test this hypothesis I ran a series of two-sample, I-tailed t-tests to compare
the values of the indicators before and after the presidential election.
° l EIectIons
T a bl e 3 : C ompanson 0 f M eans B e�ore an d After P reSl°d entia
Variable

f.1

2 years before

f1

2 years after

2.93*
3.65*
GROWTH
3.01*
3.79*
RDI
5.63
UNEMPLOYMENT 5.5 1
1.21
1.73
TRANSFERS
N=240
* indicates significance at the a=O.l 0 level

Mean Difference

T-Test

0.72
0.78
-0.12
-0.52

1.4437*
1.4373*
0.6343
0.5404

The results of these difference of means tests were mixed. The GROWTH and RDI
variables prove to be significantly larger in the pre-election period, indicating that there may be
some pre-election fiscal bolstering for these indicators. This makes sense, as previous literature
predicts that rational individuals will vote retrospectively, looking at their financial situation
when deciding whether to reelect the in-party. Policymakers, aware of this general trend, would
therefore have an incentive to stimulate the economy as voters make their reelect or oust
decisions.
The differences in mean UNEMPLOYMENT between the before and after election
periods did not prove to be significant. Though the test's inability to reach the significance level
does not support the hypothesized relationship between unemployment and the political business
cycle, unemployment is still larger in the post-election period.
B. Regressions:

A probit regression looks at the relationship between probability of party reelection to the
executive office and economic indicators. The data used in this model include all election year
quarters since 1948, namely all quarters for the three years prior to the election year.
Table 4 shows the results of the probit regression predicting the probability of reelection
for incumbent parties. Because preliminary results showed that economic outcomes outside of
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the year before the election were not significant, the Inodels explores the relationship between
election results and econolnic indicator variables in the three quarters leading up to the
presidential election. For exatnple: Q1 RGDP is an interaction term between the average value of
RGDP in the presidential election year and a dutnmy for that period in the hypothesized political
business cycle. The Q3 variables should have the largest effects because they are measured right
before voters cast their ballots. The cOlnparison group for each variable is the indicators that do
not satisfy the dummy variable's timing requirelnent.
Table 4: Probit Regression Predicting
the Probability of Party Reelection
Variables

Constant

-0.0994

Explanatory Variables

Q1RGDP
0.0996
Q2RGOP
0.1047*
Q3ROGP
0.2337*
Q1RDI
0.0134
Q2RDI
0.0872*
Q3RDI
0.2114*
Q1U
0.0123
Q2U
0.0088
Q3U
0.0163
Q1TRANS
-0.0002
Q2TRANS
0.0341
Q3TRANS
0.1148*
Pseudo Rl
0.0506
N=240
* indicates significance at the a=O.l 0 level

As can be seen, the real GOP growth coefficient is positive across all indicators and
significant in the two quarters imtnediately leading up to the election. Moreover, the coefficients
for the real disposable income growth variables are also positive and significant in the months
before voters go to the polls.
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Unemployment has proven to not have a significant ilupact on reelection probabilities.
While this is initially a counterintuitive result, given the limited nUluber of election cycles, it
would be easy for a large shift in the American workforce to sway the results. For example: The
1980s saw a huge influx of women and immigrants into the labor force. Because the market was
not initially able to absorb them, unemployment numbers were deceptively high. The
unemployment figures at the time said little about the health of the overall economy (Reagan's
reelection in 1984 occurred at a time when the real GDP growth rate exceeded 5.5% , but
unemployment peaked at 7.5% right before the election) as it made a transition that eventually
put more people to work than ever before. One can then see how real disposable income and real
GDP growth rates may be more closely tied with consumer sentiment. Additionally, government
transfer payments are a significant determinant of reelection only in the quarter immediately
prior to the election.
Overall these are encouraging results, indicating that positive econoluic activity that helps
consumers reflects in voters' willingness to reelect an incumbent or a member of his party.
Furthermore, and perhaps more interestingly, these results suggest a significant myopia for voter
sentiment. The fact that the real GDP growth, real disposable income growth, and transfer
payment growth variables become significant and nlagnitudinally larger closer to elections
suggests that, at the margin, voters respond strongly to economic conditions closest to the
election. They would, for example, be quick to forgive a downturn in GDP growth rates that
happened a year before if that same variable had positive indicators in the six months closest to
the election. Conversely, a president who had high economic nmubers during three years of his
term might not be able to get away with bad economic numbers if they came in the year leading
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up to the general election day. These results suggest that voters are heavily myopic when they go
to the polls, and they have little Inemory outside of their most recent econolnic situation.
The OLS regression run for Table 5 regresses the Inargin of victory variable against the
independent macroeconolnic indicators. The results of this regression are distinct from those
reported in Table 4 in that they examine the extent to which voters respond to econolnic
conditions, rather than just measuring whether or not the incumbent or a member of his party is
elected for another tenn. The adjusted r-squared values for this regression suggest that this
specification does a sOlnewhat better job of explaining the impact of macroeconomic variables
on election outcomes.
Table 5: OLS Regression Predicting the
M argln 0 f V'IC tory �or th e Incumb en t P a rty
.

Variables

Constant

0.0] 38

E xplanatory Variables

Q]RGDP
0.006
Q2RGDP
0. 143*
Q3RDGP
0.248*
Q]RDI
0.007
Q2RDI
0. 1 ] ] *
Q3RDI
0.323*
Q IU
-0.004
Q2U
-0.067
Q3U
-0. 140*
Q]TRANS
0.003
Q2TRANS
0.006
Q3TRANS
0. 134*
Adjusted-RL
0. 1 14
N=240
* indicates significance at the a=0. 10 level
The RGDP and RDI variables continue to be significant in the quarters right before the
general election. Additionally, the magnitude of the coefficients is larger as the election draws
closer, indicating again that voters are sOlnewhat Inyopic about a president's record and they
tend to heavily discount past economic activity when making their election calculus. Transfer
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payments are also significant in the OLS regression, and it is clear that this variable has the
greatest effect during the third quarter.
The fact that the unemployment variable assumes significance in this regression is a
departure from the results of the probit model in Table 6. However, because this OLS regression
picks up on subtleties within the election results themselves, there is more variation in the data
from which to draw statistical significance.
The appendix of this paper explores four election case studies. The first two elections
reported occurred at times when the real GDP growth rate was especially low, and the incumbent
party's candidates both lost their election bids. Alternatively, the latter two case studies consider
what happens when real GD P growth rates are high. While the opposing party brings many other
issues into the election, the incumbent party still carries the election by a considerable popular
margin when the economy is doing well in both cases.
VII. Conclusions

This paper attempts to extend the analysis of Tufte's political business cycle into the
present using recent American presidential elections data between 1948 and 2008. It pays
particular attention to large-scale economic indicators and the way those variables can affect
political outcomes for the executive branch. Regressions are run using two measures of electoral
success: an incumbent party's reelection dummy and a variable that examines the margin of
victory between the incumbent party and the opposing major political party. Furthermore, case
studies help illustrate specific incumbent government policies for key elections. Results show
that there is a strong relationship between the state of the economy and election outcomes. This
suggests that poli�icians have a strong incentive to manipulate the economy to increase the
probability that they (or a member of their party) will be reelected. However, the case studies
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show that adtuinistrations take different paths when it comes to trying to run a political business
cycle. Additionally, voters are retrospective but heavily myopic when they are tuaking their
voting decisions. They discount more distant economic activity during the sitting president's
tenu in favor of evaluating the most recent econotuic conditions. Tufte mentions Nixon as a
prituary exatuple. By extending the timeline through the 1980s and into the present, the appendix
of this paper suggests that Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush may have tried to strengthen the
econOlUY in anticipation of the national election.
The theory surrounding political business cycles is difficult to prove empirically,
especially as the cycle relates to specific policy measures. Politicians on different sides of the
aisle are inclined to bolster the econOlUY by focusing on different segluents of society and
different luacroeconoluic indicators (the tradeoff between growth and unemployment being one
example). However, it is interesting to note that for luany politicians, the presence of an
upcoming election gives presidents the incentive to increase government spending to teluporarily
push the econOlUY past its natural growth rate.
The analysis in this paper exatuines large scale economic indicators like real RGDP
growth rates and uneluploYluent to lay the groundwork for a prelituinary understanding of
political business cycles, how they work, and whether they affect voting outcomes. Having found
evidence of a political business cycle in the sixteen case saluple, it would be reasonable for
future researchers to track specific governluent policies in tilue with the presidential election to
see if a pattern emerges between the election and specific governluent spending progratus. One
research technique luight be to divide the cases between Republican and Democratic incumbent
adtuinistrations to see if substantial differences exist between the two groups in tenus of which
policy measures are luore often advanced and funded.
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Similarly, the variables observed in this study Inay be too broad to fully capture the
impact of economic outcomes on incumbents' political performance. Future research might be
well served to examine specific government policies that are not subject to automatic
fluctuations (such as the transfer payment growth variable included in this paper). In order to
"
increase the sample size, and also extend the scope of this paper, it lnight also prove useful to
explore data from other developed countries with electoral systems similar to that of the United
States to determine if like systelns experience similar electoral-economic cycles.
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Appendix

The case studies for this section were selected by averaging the RGDP growth rates
during the last Inonth before the general election for the sixteen election cycles, and then
calculating the standard deviation. The following four cases are the only ones that have RGDP
growth rates during that period that fell at least one standard deviation above or below the
calculated average. Case studies 1 and 2 will focus on situations where the RGDP growth rates
were notably low� studies 3 and 4 provide exatnples of adlninistrations that increased
governlnent spending (and therefore the RGDP growth rate) rapidly right before the November
election. Note the fact that in the first two case studies, when RGDP growth rates are at their
population low for this paper, both incumbent parties lost their bids for reelection. For the last
two case studies, both inculnbent candidates won by considerable Inargins.
Case Study 1: Nixon

v.

Kennedy (1960)

The first two case studies examine instances where the incumbent party was unable to
secure reelection, at least in part this paper argues, because they were unwilling or unable to run
effective political business cycles.
The US Presidential election of 1960 nlarked the end of Dwight Eisenhower's two terms
in the White House. Eisenhower's Vice President, Richard Nixon, was now running as the
inculnbent candidate against Senator John F. Kennedy froln Massachusetts. The electoral vote
was the closest in any presidential catnpaign dating back to 1916, and Kennedy ultimately
defeated the inculnbent party's candidate by one of the smallest Inargins of victory (in popular
vote terms) in history. (Gallup, 1972)
Central to the political catnpaign that season was the issue of keeping up with the Soviet
Union both economically and Inilitarily. This would require a strong financial and econolnic
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environment for both the government and the voters, and it appears that the electorate tnay have
taken the state of the economy into account when heading to the polls that Novetnber.
Based on the results observed in the regressions above, it makes sense to analyze the
economic situation in the last quarters before the election. The first quarter of the year was
admittedly a strong one, and it boasted a real GDP annual growth rate of 9.2%. However, in the
three subsequent quarters growth dropped dramatically, falling to -1.99% in the second quarter
and up to only 0.62% in the third quarter immediately preceding the election. (May, 1990)
Adlai Stevenson once described the �'liberal hour" as that time before presidential
elections when "even the most obsolete Republicans become momentarily reconciled to the
machine age" (May, 1990), indicating that even those politicians who were normally fiscally
conservative would engage in expansionary economic policies to enhance their or their party's
chances at reelection. Eisenhower's refusal to stimulate the economy before the 1960
presidential election potentially speaks volUlnes about the political business cycle and Tufte's
assumption that all US presidents in post-World War n titnes have had an incentive to create one
that favors reelection.
Looking at actual and full employment budget figures, May (1990) observes that fiscal
policy became contractionary in 1959 and 1960. The actual federal budget went from a deficit of
$ 10.3 billion in 1958 to a surplus of $3.4 billion in 1960. She estimates that Eisenhower's fiscal
policy depressed estimated real GDP by $9.4 billion in 1960. Additionally, monetary policy was
contractionary during this time. Bach (197 1) observes that monetary authorities at the Federal
Reserve by and large shared the White House's contractionary view.
Eisenhower's actions as the sitting president at the time of the 1960 election did little to
enhance the probability that a Republican successor would follow him into the White House. In
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fact, Inany have argued that he did a great deal to jeopardize Nixon's chances. The end of the
Eisenhower presidency provides a compelling example of Tufte's political business cycle
hypothesis. According to May (1990), economists have generally been satisfied with the
explanation that Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism was unusually fixed, though this case study
also points to the possibility that there may be different incentives involved when a sitting
president is not running for reelection.
Case Study 2: McCain

v.

Obama (2008)

The Inost recent presidential election provides an example far different from the previous
one. While the 1960 and the 2008 election are similar in that both had retiring presidents and
slacking economic indicators, George W. Bush departed markedly from Eisenhower in that he
made sincere and lnassive last lninute attempts to boost the economy before November.
However, these efforts were too little, too late, and the incumbent party was defeated with a
margin of victory for Obama and the Democrats of more than seven percentage points.
Polls taken in the last few months of the presidential campaign revealed that the economy
was the top concern for voters. In the fall of 2008, many news sources were reporting to the
public that the econolny was suffering frOln the worst economic downturn since the Great
Depression. During this tilne McCain's election prospects fell sharply as he lnade comments
suggesting that "the fundatnentals of the econOlny are strong."
One lnonth before the election, McCain left the catnpaign trail to return to Washington to
craft a $700 billion bailout package for the troubled financial industry. This piece of legislation,
chatnpioned by both a conservative sitting president and the lnan his party had chosen to follow
hiln in office, can be viewed as a pritnary exatnple of political lnanipulation of the econolny in
order to secure reelection. The bailout lnoney, if injected quickly into the economy, would, under
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a Keynesian framework, increase aggregate delnand, increase employment, and increase real
GDP, at least for a time. Although the stimulus would eventually be injected into the economy,
the passage of the bill alone was not helpful to the Republican incumbent because, at the time of
the election, most of the bill's measures had yet to be impletnented. The measure ultimately fell
short of the major unstated objective (reelection of the sitting president's party), and it
emphasizes the importance of trying to run these political business cycles when the economy is
suffering.
Ultimately, however, the poor state of the econOlny cost McCain and his party the
election. Having already determined that the final financial quarter before an election is
especially important, it is no surprise that McCain lost, given that the real GDP f,Tfowth rate at the
time of his election was -0.52%. (Schnur, 2008)
Case Study 3: Nixon v. McGovern (1972)

The following two case studies look at elections where the incumbent president was able
to secure reelection for himself, in part this paper argues, because of expansionary fiscal policies
in the months before the general election.
Nixon's 1972 campaign against McGovern epitomizes the political business cycle on the
national stage. It inspired both Nordhaus's and Tufte's early theoretical model of political
business cycles on which most empirical tests today are still based. Nixon's efforts awarded hiln
a substantial victory: He received electoral votes from 49 of the 50 states, and had a margin of
victory between himself and McGovern of more than 23 percentage points.
It generally seems to be the case that, when the econolny is functioning well, it is not
brought up as an issue of serious concern in presidential elections. This case is no exception.
McGovern preferred to run a campaign criticizing the government for not having done enough to
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guarantee a IninilnUln wage for full-tilne elnployed workers. People were more willing to focus
on abstract issues of hulnan dignity when their pocketbooks were safe.
This did not keep Nixon from trying to boost the state of the econolny before the
November election. Congress passed a bill that granted Social Security recipients a 20% increase
in their benefits (checks were sent out October 1, about one Inonth before the election), and the
seasonality of contributions to the federal payroll tax for social security left many individuals
with a higher real disposable income in the months leading up to Election Day. Growth in
veterans' benefits also increased substantially in the last quarter before the election, a growth rate
triple the average in the last ten years. These last lninute fiscal adjusttnents demonstrate that the
government anticipates voters' myopia. By acting late in the cmnpaign, the incumbent and his
party were able to assure that voters would be at their economic best when they entered the
voting booth. (Tufte, 1978)
Readers should be careful, however, in placing too much emphasis on the Nixon case.
Beyond the state of the econolny, Nixon also ran his cmnpaign during Vietnam, and some fear
politics likely contributed to his overwhelming support. Furthennore, it is worth mentioning that
post- 1972, most transfer dollars were not discretionary; most of the money became automatically
tied to specific economic indicators, such as unemployment figures.
Case Study 4: Reagan

v.

Mandale (1984)

The final case examined in this paper looks at the reelection of incumbent president
Ronald Reagan against challenger Walter Mondale. Reagan was helped by a strong economic
recovery froln the deep recession of 1981-1982 and he carried 49 of the 50 states, becoming only
the second president in history to do so after Nixon's 1972 reelection. In the national popular
vote, Reagan received 58.80/0 of the popular vote, compared to Mondale's 40.60/0, for a margin of
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victory of over 18 percentage points. Note again that these two case studies were chosen because
their economies boasted the largest real GDP growth rates in the sample. There seems to be a
clear positive correlation between expansive economic activity and the margin of victory.
At the tilne of his reelection, President Reagan's econolny had made a strong recovery
and had an average real GDP growth rate of 5.60/0 in 1984. During his first administration,
Reagan had ushered in an era of "Reaganomics," the tenets of which sought to reduce increases
in government spending, tax rates, and regulations. Furthermore, the Republican administration
looked to the Federal Reserve to control the money supply and reduce inflation. During Reagan's
first administration, income tax rates on the top personal tax bracket dropped 50% and the
increase in the number of jobs was able to keep pace with population growth.
Though a Republican and a fiscal conservative in theory, there were elements of
Reagan's fiscals policies which looked very Keynesian and could have contributed to a political
business cycle around the time of his reelection. In an effort to end the Cold War, Reagan's
administration increased government expenditure for defense spending. This caused large budget
deficits, an expansion of the US trade deficit, and it also contributed to the Savings and Loan
crisis. However, in the short run, this spending increased employment and expanded growth. It is
unclear whether Reagan intentionally ran a timed political business cycle; however, his
expansionary policies in 1984 probably contributed to a national sentiment that the economy and
the country as a whole were healthy. This may have contributed to Reagan's landslide victory.
(Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001)
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